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Settings in which more than one principal attempts to influence the behavior of a 
single agent are common. One area in which these relationships are prevalent is in the 
interaction between economic and political actors. Lobbying, where the government actor 
is the common agent of private principals, and regulatory bureaucracy in which a firm 
may be regulated by several governmental agencies are examples of situations in which a 
model that includes common agency can augment the basic principal agent framework in 
a useful way.  Dixit has developed a model that is intended to capture essential aspects of 
common agency as they are reflected in political economy. This paper presents the results 
of an experimental test of a simplified version of the Dixit model.  The experimental test 
investigates the main result of that model which implies that incentives for the agent 
weaken under common agency.   
The paper proceeds in the following way: Section 2 presents a simple model that 
generates clear hypotheses about the power of incentives when the number principals 
vary.  This model differs from Dixit’s by eliminating the stochastic component of the 
problem.  The relation of this model to previous experimental work on agency theory is 
reviewed. Section 4 outlines the experimental protocol and Section 5 presents the 
experimental results. 
 
2   A Common Agency Model 
The exploration of common agency is tested experimentally as a repeated game in a 
linear contracting setting.  The theoretical solution is presented below for a single round   3
which, by backwards induction, is the same in all rounds of the game. First the solution is 
presented for the case of a single principal and a single agent who carries out two tasks.   
 
2.1   Benchmark : The Single Principal Case 
 A contract,  () β α α ω , , 2 1 = is chosen by the principal.  The contract consists of 
incentive payments for each task,  { } 2 , 1 , 1 ,..., 1 , = − + ∈ i i i i i α α α α α which represent the 
marginal benefit of output for the agent for each task, and { } β β β β β , 1 ,..., 1 , − + ∈ a fixed 
payment
1.  
Next the agent decides whether to accept or reject the offered contract.  
a)  If the contract is rejected both parties receive their reservation payments of zero. 
b)   If the agent accepts the contract he chooses effort levels,  { } 2 , 1 ,.. 0 = ∈ i t t i i and 
the output  i x  is determined by  2 , 1 , = = i t x i i . 
Payoffs to the principal and agent,  P π  and  A π , are the following. 
a)  If the contract is rejected,  0 = = A P π π  
b)  If the contract is accepted, 
() β α π − ′ − = x b P  
  Ct t x A ′ − + ′ = β α π . 
                                                        
1 In the experimental implementation,  α α − = , and  β β − = . Negative and positive incentives and fixed 
fees are allowed.   4














C .   The choice variables  α , t  are vectors of dimension 2 by 1, with  
β a scalar. 
 
2.2 The Single Principal Solution 
      The equilibrium solution for the game is derived in two stages. First the equilibrium 
effort level of the agent is determined as a function of the incentive choices of the 
principal. The principal then chooses incentives given the first stage result. In stage one, 
the agent chooses an effort level to satisfy 
  A t t π max arg ≡  2.1 
The solution  ) ( * α t defines a best reply function in response to any α offered by the 
principal. The participation constraint 
      0 ≥ A π   2.2 
must also be satisfied by the contract  () β α ω ,.  
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 act as constraints on the principal and so his problem is to 
      P π
β α , max  s.t. 2.1 and 2.2. 
In equilibrium, optimality requires that the participation constraint binds and so the 
entire surplus goes to the principal. The principal offers full incentives,  2 , 1 , = = i bi i α  
and then uses the fixed component, β , to extract the surplus from the agent. The 
equilibrium contract then is  ( ) Ct t x ′ + ′ − = α α α ϖ , , 2 1 , and the resulting payoffs are  
   5
Cx x bx P ′ − = π  
0 = A π . 
. 
2.3   The Case of Two Principals  
In the extension to two principals, benefits are distributed across the principals so 
that  [ ] 12 11 1 b b b = ′ , and  [] 22 12 2 b b b = ′ , with the first subscript referring to the principal, 
the second to the task. In the experimental implementation and in the solution that 
follows we restrict attention to the case where each principal benefits from one of the 
tasks exclusively. The marginal benefits are thus given by  [] 0 11 1 b b = ′ , and 
[] 22 2 0 b b = ′ . 
The sequencing of the game, is as in the single principal case, with each principal 
first creating a contract for the agent.  Each principal can create incentives for both of the 
tasks.  
Each principal selects from  { } 2 , 1 , , 1 ,..., 1 , = − + ∈ j i ij ij ij ij
j
i α α α α α .  
 
The agent’s solution to the first stage is given by  





i i ≠ =
+
= , 2 , 1 , , *
α α
α  
The opportunity for each principal to influence the agent’s efforts related to the other 
principals task leads to a non-cooperative equilibrium in which aggregate incentives are 
reduced.  Principal i’s problem given the rational behavior of the agent is to  
     () ( ) i i i t b
i
α α
α * max ′ − .   6
The resulting equilibrium yields  ii ii b
3
2
= α , and  jj ij b
3
1
− = α .  Aggregate incentives in the 






= α  where  j i j i ji ii
M
i ≠ = + = , 2 , 1 , , α α α .  
The solution yields a single equilibrium in incentives. The aggregate fixed fee is also 




The game played in the experimental treatment presents the subjects with a 
simpler agency problem than is found in the model of moral hazard developed by Dixit. 
Since risk-sharing motivations are absent, the optimal action of the principal is to “sell 
the firm” at the price of the entire surplus. The simpler model however, obtains the same 
basic result as under moral hazard; incentives are weakened by the introduction of an 
additional principal.   
 
3 Experimental Protocol 
There has been limited exploration of the impact of multiple principals in the 
experimental literature
2. Work in the single principal setting as well as in other 
                                                        
2 Multiple principals were studied by Kirchsteiger and Prat, although not in a way that is directly relevant to 
the current research.  These authors investigate the behavioral validity of Bernheim and Whinston’s 
(1986b) truthful equilibrium in an environment with two principals, a single agent, and a single task.  They 
find that the truthful equilibrium is rarely chosen and instead subjects appear to play a less efficient 
‘natural’ equilibrium, which is computationally less complex.  
   7
proposer/responder settings such as the ultimatum game suggest what some of the 
relevant concerns may be in the extension to multiple principals.  
  Anderhub Gachter and Konigstein (AGK hereafter) create an environment with a 
single principal and single agent that is similar to that used in the present research. AGK 
use a linear contracting framework without random shocks in output. The equilibrium 
result is thus the same “sell the firm” equilibrium discussed above. The authors report 
that while incentive constraints were often recognized, participation constraints generally 
did not bind. In addition, agent effort choices were related to the sharing of the surplus, 
suggesting the existence of a  ‘reciprocity-compatible’ constraint.  
The reciprocity finding of AGK plays an important role in the current design. In 
order to analyze the impact of the multiple principals on reciprocity it is necessary to 
distinguish the behavioral impact of the multiple equilibria with respect to the fixed 
portion of the contract from the reciprocity concerns that relate to the agent. Both of these 
issues suggest that the agent may receive surplus in excess of the Nash equilibrium 
prediction, since the existence of the multiple equilibria suggest that a principal may be 
motivated to lower its share of the surplus to guard against the possibility that the 
reciprocity constraint is violated by the inequitable allocation of the fixed fee between 
principals
3.  In order to understand how the two effects interact, a treatment is 
implemented in which the reciprocity constraint is eliminated through the use of a 
computerized agent.  In this case the contract would be rejected only if the principal’s 
jointly failed to provide the agent a non-negative return. Thus the experiment consists of 
a two by two factorial design with both one and two principals and a human and   8
computerized agent.  Table 1 outlines the predictions for incentives and surplus share in 
each of the cells. 
 
Table 1: Theoretical predictions of the cells. 
  Robotic Agent  Human Agent 
Single Principal  Incentives:  b = α  
Surplus Share: Satisfies 
participation constraint  
Incentives:  b = α  
Surplus Share: Satisfies 
reciprocity constraint:  
Two  Principals  Incentives:  3 b = α  
 
Surplus Share: Coordination 
yields “noisy equilibrium.” 
“Noise” goes to agent.  
Incentives:  3 b = α  
 
Surplus Share: Reciprocity 






The experiments reported here were conducted in April and May at the University 
of Maryland College Park.   Subjects played the single and multiple principal contracting 
game outlined above with a computerized agent, programmed to respond optimally to the 
incentive, and to reject any contract in which its optimal response violated the 
participation constraint. The contrast between the single (SP) and two (TP) principal 
treatments was stark. 
  The results of the last three rounds of the contracting game are reported.  First a 
simple measure of efficiency is presented.  This measure is the amount of surplus created 
divided by the total possible surplus. In the single principal case, the efficiency was close 
to 1. With two principals efficiency was reduced to .56.  This result, given the optimal 
                                                                                                                                                                     
3 The equilibrium concept related to the fixed fee is a variant of the “noisy equilibrium” introduced by 
Mckelvey and Palfrey (1992) and applied by Goeree and Holt (2001). In the noisy equilibrium there is a 
positive probability of obtaining any of the equilibrium distributions of the surplus.    9
responses of the agent, was consistent with the lower powered incentives in the aggregate 
contract in the two principal treatment.   The proportion of the surplus that remained with 
the agent is an indication of the coordination problems that arise in the TP treatment due 
to the multiple equilibria in the fixed fee. In the single principal case the agent received 
2% of the surplus. In the multiple principal case 23% was left to the computerized agent. 
The measures are presented in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Mean and Standard Deviation of Performance Measures 
Treatment  Efficiency   Share to 
Agent 









These preliminary results are consistent with the predictions of the multiple 
principal theory with regards to the direction of the effects.  The magnitude of the 
efficiency loss however is less than predicted, since the Nash equilibrium implies 








                                                                                                                                                                     
4 This draft reports on the initial treatments with the computerized agent only.       10 
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